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Part I: Subsistence
Rights
In Defense of Social
Justice: From Global
Transformation to Local
Resistance
- Donna L. Chollett

Struggles for Social Rights in Latin America is the
authoritative collection for exploring the broad
span of social rights struggles in Latin America.
This pioneering book explores how, when, and
why a broad range of groups have struggled to
secure a range of social rights in Latin America.
Essays come from a range of scholars in a variety
of disciplines and tackle the most pressing
concerns in Latin American societies. The essays
present Latin Americans' own views, deprivations
and struggles over rights. It is the first book to
portray in rich and nuanced detail the different
Latin American class, ethnic, racial, gender and
sexual minority perceptions of their social rights
and struggles to secure greater justice.
Individual topics include the environment, AIDS,
workers' rights, women's movements, citizenship,
indigenous rights, tourism, and many more. With
all original essays from top scholars in the field,
this is an invaluable resource for exploring and
understanding the intricacies and diversities of
human rights struggles across Latin America.
Reviews
This is a big, bountiful anthology that addresses
the most pressing issues of social injustice and
the movements that have responded to them in
Latin America..
June Nash, author of Mayan Visions

IN DEFENSE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE:
FROM GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION TO LOCAL RESISTANCE
INTRODUCTION
The global transformations that enveloped Latin America over the past decade resulted in uneven
consequences for diverse social groups. Scholars witness an increasing tension between a
macro-economic agenda concerned with profitability and local community access to employment
and sustenance.

As neoliberal reforms intensify Latin America's integration into the world

economy, they may adversely impact local communities. Should local people lose their ability to
obtain basic rights, will they be able to effectively challenge the neoliberal model? In the absence
of more adequate attention to social justice, it is probable that occurrences of local resistance in
defense of these rights will escalate.
From the perspective of policy makers, neoliberalism promised important advantages. Debtridden Latin American countries adopted IMF-mandated polices as a condition for debt
restructuring. In turn, they received access to new loans. Neoliberal policies also promised to
stimulate economic growth.

According to this logic, the privatization of inefficient parastatal

industries would contribute to modernization and greater profitability. As a result, an increase in
export production would generate revenues for the benefit of the national economy.
From the perspective of those who live with the consequences of neoliberal policies, the
benefits remain elusive. Privatizations replaced state paternalism inherent in parastatal industries
with a more profit-oriented managerial system. Frequently this change involved large worker
layoffs and reduction of credit to small-scale producers. Simultaneously, global market integration
placed local producers in competition with more economically competitive international actors. As
a result, many small-scale producers and workers suffered declining incomes.
Below, I analyze the impact of neoliberalism on the Mexican sugar sector. Privatization of
Mexican sugar mills from 1988-1992 and the inclusion of sugar trade into the 1994 NAFTA
agreement dramatically transformed sugar production and marketing. In the 1990s, food and

beverage processors in Mexico began to replace cane sugar with lower-cost HFCS (high fructose
corn syrup) in their products. Competition with alternative sweeteners imported from the U.S.
hindered the ability of Mexican refineries to market their sugar, leaving them with severe cash-flow
problems that imperiled the industry. Sugar industry officials predicted that HFCS will force 20
sugar mills to close. In addition, pressure by political interest groups to modify NAFTA in regard to
trade in sugar and HFCS circumvented the "free hand of the market," placing sugar mills at
greater risk.
Next, I present an in-depth community study of Puruarán, Michoacán, to examine the local
consequences of these transformations. In this case, the mill owner closed down the community's
sugar mill, leaving residents unemployed. While mill owners tend to view cane growers and
workers as unproductive, local growers and workers at Puruarán mobilized in defiance of police
repression to defend their right to employment.
The research is based on fieldwork, from 1997 to 2001, that addressed several research
questions:

Did privatization of sugar mills contribute to productive efficiency and increased

earnings? By 1997, some growers, who earlier experienced debts, succeeded in earning small
profits. Was this experience universal? While some mills showed economic recovery, corporate
consolidation (the concentration of production into fewer mills) and market opening under NAFTA
contributed to the closure of the Puruarán mill.
Six of Mexico's 60 sugar mills closed their doors between 1986 and 1997. Thus, Ingenio (sugar
mill) Puruarán with its community of 11,373 inhabitants is not representative. The importance of
this case lies in the absence of research that examines the impact of agroindustrial shutdowns on
rural communities.

Puruarán is unique because it is the only community where a social

movement emerged to contest the mill closing. What makes this community significant is the
potential closure of 20 more Mexican sugar mills as HFCS imports under NAFTA displace cane
sugar. Events that jeopardized social justice in Puruarán stand to be replicated.

The research involved formal and informal interviews with a non-random sample of cane
growers, ex-mill workers, and community leaders, to ascertain the impact of mill closure on the
community. These data reveal changes in economic strategies, household income, attitudes
about the mill closure, and involvement in efforts to reopen the mill. Sugar industry offices in
Mexico City provided additional data to situate Puruarán within the national context.
GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS
Mexico's 1980s debt crisis served as a catalyst for neoliberal reforms aimed at economic
restructuring.

IMF's solution for debt restructuring and economic recovery called for

privatization of industries and dismantling of barriers to international trade.

Privatization

became the anecdote for government mismanagement of Mexico's parastatals.

While

privatization freed up government resources, market integration contributed to foreign exchange
earnings. The privatization of state-owned sugar mills from 1988 to 1992 and the enactment of
NAFTA in 1994 brought profound consequences for Mexican sugarcane growers and mill
workers.
Privatization resulted in the consolidation of 50 sugar mills into 11 consortiums. These
consortiums maintained linkages to a variety of enterprisesi and established easy access to sugar
for their sugar-based products. Twenty-five mills, for example, held soft drink franchises with
Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, and Mexican soft drinks.
Initially, a severe crisis besieged the sugar sector: new owners failed to invest in modernizing
their mills, market opening flooded the country with imported sugar,ii mechanical failures left
unprocessed cane rotting in the fields, and cane growers experienced large debts to mill owners
(Chollett 1995). Buyouts of one consortium by another, and the splitting of certain consortiums
reflected the volatility of the sugar sector. By 1994, however, the sugar sector showed signs of
recovery.

As new investments rejuvenated the industry, Mexico regained its sugar export

capacity and cane growing became somewhat profitable. In 1997, acreage, yields, and factory
efficiency all showed significant increases.iii

Despite record production, by 2000, industrialists accumulated debts of two billion dollars.
Inability to pay off loans provoked the failure of FINASA, the government financial institution for
the sugar sector. The cane harvest of 2000-2001 ended in May, yet industrialists were unable
to pay growers for their cane. During July and August, 2001 cane growers marched on Mexico
City and seized government buildings, including the Secretariat of Agriculture, in demand of
back payments in the amount of $500,000,000 dollars. Grupo Santos, owner of the Puruarán
sugar mill, owed a debt of $200,000,000. President Vicente Fox, in response, expropriated 27
of Mexico’s 59 sugar mills in September, with the intent of consolidating and reselling them.
Among the expropriated mills are those belonging to Grupos Santos, GAM, CAZE, and
Machado. Many of these may face the same fate as Ingenio Puruarán.
The impressive national-level achievements cited above were not uniform. Private mill owners
increased profitability of their mills by favoring more efficient cane growers. They denied credit to
less efficient growers, often forcing them out of cane production. In some cases, mill managers
assumed direct control of the land until the cañeros' debts were paid off. In other cases, they
denied entry of low-yielding cane for processing. These policies marginalized producers with
fewer resources and created substantial hardships for family survival.
Similarly, mill owners concentrated their interests in fewer mills by favoring their more
productive refineries and excluding their less efficient mills. Six sugar refineries closed following
privatization: Ingenio Oacalco, Morelos (1988); Ingenio Estipac, Jalisco (1988); Ingenio José
López Mateos Juchitán, Oaxaca (1992); Ingenio Purísima, Jalisco (1992); Ingenio Puruarán,
Michoacán (1992); and Ingenio Rosales, Sinaloa (1997).
Grupo Azucarero Mexico, affiliated with Pepsico, exemplifies this process. Its owners bought
out Grupo Sucrum, formerly owned by Alberto Santos de Hoyos. Santos purchased four mills in
1991, forming Grupo Santos. This entrepreneur sealed the fate of the Puruarán mill in 1992,
when he claimed the mill unprofitable, closed it, and consolidated his interests in the three
remaining Santos refineries (Alianza Popular, San Luis Potosí; Bellavista, Jalisco; and

Pedernales, Michoacán). While this strategy promotes productive efficiency, it disregards the
social and economic impact on sugar-producing communities.
NAFTA
NAFTA integrates Mexico into the North American market in consequential ways. Pre-NAFTA
studies offered varying predictions concerning NAFTA's impact on employment, yet many
projected substantial job increases.

The creation of hundreds of thousands of new jobs

benefited the automotive, electronics, and maquiladora industries. Since enactment of NAFTA,
however, the economic crisis and competition with foreign firms and goods caused 28,000
businesses and two million Mexican jobs to disappear (Hansen-Kuhn 1997).

Imported

commodities that flooded the Mexican market in the 1990s undermined many rural producers.
With respect to the sugar sector, Mexico's integration into NAFTA threatens the livelihoods of
unprecedented numbers of cañeros and workers.
Important considerations distinguish sugar production in the U.S. and Mexico.

Subsidies to

U.S. sugar growers and a restrictive tariff-rate quota on sugar imports maintain an artificially
high price for U.S. sugar. The beneficiaries of U.S. sugar policy accrue to one percent of
American farmers as a form of corporate welfare.

In contrast to the U.S., where 851,000

hectares of land were in cane and sugarbeet production, Mexico had 582,746 hectares of cane
under cultivation in 1997. The U.S. concentrates its sugar industry in 12 sugar refineries, while
the Mexican industry extends across 60 production zones. U.S. cane and sugarbeet growers
hold, on average, 100-150 hectares in Louisiana and Texas, and 11,000 hectares in Hawaii and
Florida. Mexican cane growers average 3.5 hectares on ejido (agrarian reform) lands, and 12
hectares on private landholdings (Buzzanell and Lord 1993). In Mexico, 145,145 cañeros and
264,411 workers directly depend on the sugar industry; the sector indirectly supports 2,424,969
individuals (CNIAA, Cámara Nacional de las Industrias Azucarera y Alcoholera). Thus, market
integration affects fewer, wealthy industrialists in the U.S., while thousands of Mexicans
representing a range of social classes depend on the sugar industry for their survival.

Competition between the two countries sharpened with enactment of NAFTA.

NAFTA

prescribes a 15-year phase-out of tariffs. During the first six years, NAFTA allowed Mexico to
export 25,000 tons of sugar to the U.S. (.0055% of its national production); in year seven, it could
export up to 250,000 tons. If, after six years, Mexico acquired surplus producer status for two
consecutive years, it could then export all of its surplus, duty-free, to the U.S. NAFTA defines
exportable sugar as the surplus that exceeds domestic sugar consumption. The potential to
export sugar to the U.S. represented a major benefit for Mexico under the NAFTA agreement.
Nonetheless, the U.S. allowed Mexico to export only 25,000 tons until 2000-2001, increasing
allowable exports to 116,000 tons in 2000-2001 and 137,788 tons for 2001-2002.
A closer look at trade between the two countries reveals an unbalanced playing field. In
addition to disparities in the two economies, political interests circumvented the free trade
principles stipulated by the original NAFTA document.

U.S. cane and sugarbeet growers

formed a powerful lobby to oppose NAFTA. They feared that Mexico would switch to HFCS in
its soft drink industry, thus generating a larger sugar surplus for export. An increase in Mexican
exports threatened to depress U.S. sugar prices. Under this pressure, last minute modifications
to NAFTA provided U.S. sugar producers a decided advantage. NAFTA redefined Mexico's
exportable sugar as the excess above domestic consumption of cane sugar and high fructose
corn syrup (Butler and Otero 1995).
High fructose corn syrup generated a war of sweeteners within the context of NAFTA. As the
U.S. fructose industry expanded at the expense of sugar in the 1970s and 1980s, the government
protected U.S. growers by imposing quotas on sugar imports (Buzzanell and Lord 1993). Sugar
imports retracted from five million to one or two million tons.
Mexico, however, regained its sugar export capacity and in 1997 production reached a
historical benchmark of 5,174,028 tons. Just when Mexico placed more of its surplus sugar on
the world market, world overproduction brought international sugar prices down.

Therefore,

SECOFI (Mexico's Secretary of Commerce) requested an increase in Mexico's quota to the U.S.,

since U.S. sugar prices exceeded those on the world market. Officials in Mexico's sugar industry
complained that the persistence of U.S. quotas prevented Mexico from taking advantage of
market integration under NAFTA.
U.S. companies that promoted HFCS as a sugar substitute in Mexico also undercut demand for
cane sugar on Mexico's domestic market. In 1992, the U.S. exported 20,000 tons of HFCS to
Mexico (Kessel, Buzzanell, and Lord 1993); this amount increased to 350,000 tons in 1997
(Muñoz 1997). The United States exported 1.3 million tons of high fructose corn syrup to Mexico
from 1994, when NAFTA came into effect, until the year 2000 (Ortiz 2000), leaving sugar mill
warehouses stocked with surplus sugar. In 2000-2001, the U.S. exported 400,000 tons of HFCS
to Mexico, in addition to U.S.-based plants that produced 300,000 tons of fructose within Mexico.
The lower price of fructose relative to cane sugar and a NAFTA phase-out of tariffs on HFCS, will
further increase the flow of HFCS to Mexico. The USDA projects that by the year 2008, fructose
is expected to capture 90 percent of the soft drink market and 37 percent of the total sweetener
market (Cruz 1997; Kessel et al. 1993; Rudiño 1998).
The connection between soft drink production and HFCS in Mexico is significant in this context.
Industrial sugar consumption, a mere 762,386 tons in 1970, reached 2,534,929 tons by 1995. In
1991, soft drinks alone accounted for 55 percent of industrial sugar consumption in Mexico
(Buzzanell and Lord 1993, García Chávez 1997).

However, domestic sugar consumption

contracted in response to its displacement by HFCS, especially in its use for Mexican soft drinks.
In 1997, a bitter conflict emerged when Mexico initiated an antidumping investigation and
raised tariffs on fructose imports. Sugar industrialists and soft drink companies reached an
accord to limit use of HFCS to 380,000 tons over a three-year period.

This agreement

committed the bottling industry to meet any increase in demand with sugar, rather than HFCS
(Flores 1997; Rudiño 1997). The U.S. Senate Agricultural Committee accused the Mexican
government of illegal actions for limiting the purchase of HFCS. The U.S. brought the matter
before the World Trade Organization for violation of the principles of NAFTA. The committee

denounced this action, stating, "The establishment of limits sanctioned by the government
would promote protectionism that NAFTA has sought to eliminate" (González 1997:27).

A

World Trade Organization decision in February 2000 determined that Mexico must repay, with
interest, provisional tariffs charged to U.S. corporations for fructose imports (U.S. Trade
Representative 2001).
Since NAFTA gives Mexico the right to export all of its surplus sugar once it achieves surplus
producer status for two consecutive years, Mexicans argue that they have the right to export
600,000 tons of sugar to the U.S. The Kantor-Serra Puche parallel letters (1993) are at the heart of
the current trade controversy. U.S. trade representative Robert Zoellick argues that this side
agreement limits imports of Mexican sugar to 250,000 tons until the year 2007. Mexico’s secretary
of commerce Ernesto Derbez disclaims the parallel letters with the argument that they were never
ratified by the Mexican congress and asserts his unwillingness to comply with resolutions of the
WTO dispute settlement body. President Fox stated his resolve to defend the industry’s right to
export all its sugar surplus and retain tariffs on fructose imports. President Bush insists that the
U.S. retain full rights to duty-free fructose exports, while maintaining its own protective barriers for
the U.S. fructose and sugar industries.
An interview with a representative of the national cane growers' union captured this critique of
the unequal trade relationship:
The U.S. imports 4,200,000 tons of sugar, but purchases only 25,000 tons from Mexico.
According to the agreement we made with the industrialists, no more than 380,000 tons of
HFCS can be sold in Mexico. Whereas sugar is the survival of the cane grower, fructose is
death for us. We intend to confront NAFTA. We are not going to allow one sugar mill to
close. We cannot let the people die; it is necessary to defend them. This is the only industry
that employs so many people in the rural sector. We are trying to protect the work of
2,000,000 cane growers. If we leave so many people without employment, where are they
going to work? When a sugar mill closes everything ends. When a sugar mill goes under,

the community goes under. This is the oldest industry, with a history of 400 years. Never in
the history of this country has it been as threatened as now.
Unbalanced trade in sweeteners, mill debts, and social unrest comprise factors that led
President Fox—former Coca Cola executive and neoliberal champion—to nationalize half of
Mexico’s sugar mills. The sugar industry is Mexico’s second largest employer and growers are
organized into powerful unions that make populist claims on the government. President Fox
imposed a 20 percent tax on soft drinks with corn syrup content on January 1, 2002. Yet, he
must also convince his North American counterparts to increase Mexico’s sugar quota. Thus,
he later announced plans to lift the tax, as he continued to negotiate an increase in sugar
exports. Mexico continues—against WTO resolution—to impose tariffs on HFCS imports from
companies such as ADM, CPI, and Staley). The controversy continues unabated, for “American
industry officials are questioning Mexico’s dedication to free markets and are contemplating new
legal challenges” (Gori 2002). It is within this context that small-scale producers and workers
must confront neoliberalism and its impact on their communities.
LOCAL TRANSFORMATIONS
Studies that document the impact of neoliberalism indicate a growing consensus that these
transformations place local societies at increasing risk and often foster social injustices (Carton de
Grammont 1995; Gates 1993; Phillips 1998).

While neoliberalism may resolve problems of

international capital accumulation, as an economic model, it often fails to address increasing
poverty, social disparities, and political unrest that may accompany such transformations (Carton
de Grammont 1995).
Policies that marginalize small-scale producers pose an important challenge for social science
analysis. Gates (1993) documents cases of economic triage, a practice that denies credit to less
efficient producers and downsizes the work force in the name of efficiency. As Phillips (1998:194)
points out, "Critical social science requires an engagement that...actively listens to representations

of the world that vary from those being offered by...neoliberalism" (1998:196). Below, I introduce
these alternative representations.
Barkin advises researchers to consider two significant forces in dynamic interaction-neoliberalism and resistance to it (Barkin, Ortiz, and Rosen 1997). Hernández and Nigh (1995)
assert that ideologies associated with globalization tend to underrate the power of local cultures.
Therefore, analysis proceeds by situating the community of Puruarán within the interaction of
global and local forces.

This analysis privileges both the impact of neoliberalism on the

community and the multiple ways that local people contested its repercussions. In analyzing both
local discourse and acts of confrontation, I illustrate how the closure of the Puruarán mill fostered
the reassertion of community identity and a social movement in defense of social justice.
Puruarán and the Community Sugar Mill
Puruarán's historical dependence on sugar production commenced with the founding of its
hacienda in 1772.

Agrarian reform in 1938 severed the unity of factory and field formerly

maintained by the hacienda. The mill eventually came into the hands of an American, Thomas D.
Boyd. When the mill went bankrupt in 1966, the National Ejidal Credit Bank took it over.
A plaque on the mill wall, dated January 31, 1966, documents this historic event when
President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) refinanced the refinery through the Ejido Bank and
improved it "in benefit of the ejidatarios [agrarian reform recipients] and inhabitants of the region."
Based on this event, residents claim that the mill rightfully belongs to the community.

This

understanding shapes local cultural identity and reinforces the importance of the community's
300-year tradition of sugar production.
During the 1970s, the government assumed ownership of decapitalized sugar mills to preserve
economic stability of the sector. It took over the Puruarán mill in 1971. But by the 1980s,
neoliberal policies called for privatization. Santos de Hoyos purchased Ingenio Puruarán in 1991.
Local residents, however, believed the mill to be property of the community and contested the
legitimacy of its sale to Santos de Hoyos.

The Puruarán and Pedernales mills were the least productive of the four refineries in the sale
package. Santos, claiming it was unprofitable, closed the Puruarán mill on May 25, 1992. The
rationale for closing "inefficient" sugar mills can be measured against data that reveal the place of
Ingenio Puruarán among other mills in the country. In 1991, Puruarán had 2,062 hectares of cane
in cultivation, industrialized 158,498 tons of cane, and produced 15,400 tons of sugar. Puruarán
represented the fifth smallest refinery in the country in volume of production. Nonetheless, in
1992, the year the mill closed, the field yield (tons of cane per hectare) at Puruarán averaged
91.63, in contrast to the national average of 74.34. Only 14 of Mexico's 62 mills surpassed
Puruarán's yields, and 48 had lower averages. While the factory yield (tons of sugar produced per
ton of cane) at Puruarán reached 9.70, the national average registered 9.28. Eighteen mills
surpassed Puruarán and 44 achieved lower factory yields. Also, in 1992, extraction of sucrose
during the processing of cane at Puruarán reached 13.01 percent, while the national average
registered 12.36 percent. Puruarán ranked twelfth in the nation (CNIAA 1995). Santos' other
mills surpassed Puruarán in volume, yet Puruarán ranked relatively high in measures of efficiency.
Overemployment contributed to inefficiency of sugar mills and taxed their profitability.
Representatives from the national mill workers' union warned workers at Puruarán in 1991 that
without a major worker layoff, the mill would be closed. An ex-worker recalled, "We did not want
to leave--we said 'all' or 'none.' Well, we were ignorant, right? Because we did not know what
agreements they had made. We said, 'If you are going to hang some, hang everyone.'" Workers
at Santos' Pedernales mill, 11 kilometers away, agreed to accept some worker layoffs, which most
likely played an important role in the rationale for keeping it open. Puruarán, on the other hand, is
a substantially larger community with an infrastructure that supports a larger number of people. In
terms of employment, the decision to close the Puruarán factory held greater impact.
The realization that HFCS reduced demand for cane sugar constituted another factor that
influenced the owner's decision to close the Puruarán mill. Low world market prices for sugar

exports and emerging competition with HFCS within Mexico made the decision to concentrate
investments in fewer mills a logical strategy.
Whereas neoliberal incentives played a major role in the decision to close the Puruarán mill,
Santos' strategy overlooked the impact borne by local residents. This refinery served as the
economic hub for Puruarán and surrounding communities. Ingenio Puruarán supported 2,260
cane growers, 800 cane cutters, 244 truck and tractor drivers, and 530 mill workers.

The

economic activity directly and indirectly benefited 36,050 inhabitants of the region. Its demise
stifled economic activity throughout the region.
The Social Impact of Mill Closure on Puruarán
The impact of neoliberal policy often goes unnoted. The abrupt termination of economic activity in
1992, however, imposed a severe crisis regarding peoples' ability to sustain family and community
forms of survival. Unemployment, increased poverty, out-migration, and violence born of social
stress played havoc in a community formerly knit by cultural traditions extending back to the
colonial period.
Economically, loss of income affected access to housing, food, clothing, education, and medical
care. Socially, Puruarán's residents experienced profound distress, mixed with rage over their
exclusion from the benefits of modernization.

Many turned to robbing, alcoholism,

narcotrafficking, and violence where no other solution materialized.

Below, I draw on local

discourse to give voice to their outrage.
Concern with preservation of their families, their community, and the right to work punctuate
conversations that fill the everyday lives of people in Puruarán. The parish priest, perceptively
attuned to the needs of the community, confided:
I arrived when it was very critical, after they closed the mill. You can still see the great
poverty because many jobs were lost. The pay from the mill that was received in all the region,
all this brought people for commerce--the commerce was lively. [But now] the stores are barely

surviving. Many [of them] closed and many ex-workers had to leave Puruarán--they had to
migrate. This was a consequence of the closing.
The first six months after I arrived, pickups with high-powered weapons passed, firing at all
hours. The people, at six in the afternoon, no longer left their houses. I believe that for lack of
employment and with the crisis here, it provoked peoples' nerves. Many young boys have been
killed by police while robbing in the streets. How many have been killed? Well, we lost count.
Here we say that when 15 days pass without an assassination, it is a long time. And the
violence continues.
This reality contrasts sharply with the historical legacy of cane and sugar production that gave
form to community life. An 82 year-old cane grower elaborated on this cultural tradition. His
father had worked at the Puruarán mill and labored in the cane fields to provide for the family. His
father taught him to cultivate cane when he was a boy.

In 1938, when President Lázaro

Cárdenas (1934-1940) distributed land to campesinos (rural workers), he received his ejido parcel
of two hectares. All of his own seven children became cane growers. Like most families in
Puruarán, the tradition of working in the cane or the mill spanned many generations.
This cañero assessed the mill closure: "We don't have any other industry... As long as I
remember this has been the only industry here. Now we have no money--from where?" He
received his highest profits, $2567 (U.S.), at Ingenio Puruarán. After the mill closed in 1992, he
delivered his cane to Ingenio Pedernales. From 1993 to 1994, he received no profits and in 1995
earned only $135 (U.S.). In his words, "The cane growers are sweating so that others can benefit.
The mill owners are enjoying their life and the poor cane grower is suffering."
Many sugarcane growers opted to deliver their cane to the Pedernales mill after the closure. Of
the 1140 cañeros who delivered cane to the Puruarán mill in 1991, 74 percent of these delivered
cane to Santos' Pedernales mill in 1998. The Pedernales mill could not process all the cane in the
two zones, cañeros paid higher transportation costs, and contracting with Ingenio Pedernales
often resulted in debts. Thus, many of these growers decided to quit sugarcane production.

One of the cañeros, who received a profit of $1605 (U.S.) at the Puruarán mill before it closed,
lost his earnings once he contracted with Pedernales in 1994. In 1995, mill supervisors left his
cane in the field, unharvested. Nonetheless, he still owed $1500 (U.S.) for production costs. The
manager of the Pedernales mill denied him credit the following year and he quit cane production.
No longer a contracted cane grower, he lost access to health insurance and retirement benefits.
Subsequently, mill supervisors attempted to rent his land. Rather than rent to the mill, he rented
out his land for pasture, providing him an income of $135 (U.S.) per year.
Unlike cañeros, all mill workers faced unemployment. One of the mill workers, with 24 years
experience in the mill, received $4000 (U.S.) in severance pay. He related how the loss of
employment affected him:
The money ran out after two months. Now I work in the campo like an animal and barely earn
$3 (U.S.) a day. This is how our government has us. Here is the part I don't understand. We
are cut off, working like monkeys cutting cane, and the clothing and everything is running out.
Another ex-mill worker lamented the hardships he endured once the mill closed:
My father worked in the mill. Here his life ended, here in Puruarán. There were four children;
we were all boys. Two of my brothers worked in the mill. Well, my father earned very little, but
he earned enough to pay the bills and to have money to spend.
I earned a little [in the mill], to buy something for my wife, or to buy shoes--I had a family too.
I was earning $42-45 (U.S.) a week when they closed the mill. And no, they did not pay us [a
severance pay] according to the law--they only gave me $1700 (U.S.). It was gone after three
months. Everything has killed me and all this money is spent. With all the obligations I have,
what am I to do? And then with no work in the campo?
Rural workers who were neither cañeros nor mill-workers also experienced the effects of the
mill closure. One of these workers related:
I have been a campesino all my life. I cut cane and whatever work there was to do. My
sons also depended on this source of work. Now, I have no work. I have looked, but there

isn't any. The people here in Puruarán need this source of work so they can survive. If our
government doesn't reopen our source of work, how are we going to live? We have to rob or
we have to plant other things, like marijuana. That is what our government is pushing us to
do. We are not to blame, if suddenly we have to rob because we are hungry. They closed
this mill only for the caprice of a single person. Imagine, for the caprice of a single person,
how many people are suffering here!
Even those with no direct relationship to the mill suffered consequences. Cane growers and
mill workers patronized local businesses and contributed to cash flow in the community. Owners
of small businesses, teachers, doctors, and others confirmed that many residents lost, on
average, 30 percent of their incomes and some faced bankruptcy.
A restaurant owner earned approximately $40 (U.S.) per day before the mill closed;
subsequently, his earnings dropped to $13-$17 (U.S.). He reflected:
The sugar mill has always been the source of work here. Before, on Fridays--payday--the
restaurant was filled, and now it is empty. In that time, on Sundays, the people formed a line all
the way down the stairway, waiting for a table. Now there is no way to maintain myself. Well, it
is very hard to keep going.
The owner of a clothing store, the only source of income for her family of seven, complained,
"Yes, you can see that [the mill closing] affected us because the sales are not the same. Before,
in one day I would sell 12 dresses, and now, one dress." She related that previously most people
bought merchandise with cash, but since the mill closed, they rely on credit: "...they buy on pure
credit. Also, I am risking because many don't pay me back." Before the mill closed, she sold
about $670 (U.S.) in clothing per week (before discounting her costs). In 1997, she averaged
$400 (U.S.)--a drop of 40 percent in her business.
These two businesses are representative of the numerous commercial enterprises in Puruarán.
All revealed a common pattern of economic decline. The mill closing also affected education in
Puruarán. Unable to pay for school uniforms, lunches, and supplies, many parents withdrew their

children from school. Enrollment at the primary and secondary level dropped by 30 percent from
1992 to 1997. Professionals, whose parents often paid for their educations with income derived
from the sugar mill, also felt the impact. A dentist in Puruarán obtained his professional education
with the earnings of his father, a sugarcane grower. The dentist served 15-20 patients per day
before the mill closed; that number fell to 5-7 per day after 1992. Both dental and medical care
have suffered, as only cane growers who contract with the Pedernales mill are covered by health
insurance. Health insurance and pension funds for all mill workers terminated when the mill
closed.
The mill closing imposed obvious economic repercussions on the community, but also brought
psychological stress which translated into alcoholism and violence. These destructive forces tore
some families apart. The extraordinary number of homes with the words "se vende" (for sale) on
their exteriors provides testimony of this hardship. Emigration to the United States is not new, yet
the mill closure forced many more to leave Puruarán. Those who left send remittances to family
members in Puruarán. Here, remittances are used for survival purposes, rather than for home
improvements or acquisition of consumer goods. Census data verify the scope of out-migration.
The population declined 16.6 percent, from 13,638 to 11,373 between 1987 and 1996.
These consequences generated diverse responses.

Alternative strategies to cope with

marginalization and ensure livelihoods ranged from efforts to find alternative sources of
employment, to thievery and drug trafficking, to out-migration. Most of the community's residents,
however, joined in a social movement to reopen the Puruarán sugar mill.
Emergence of the Social Movement
The social movement that emerged following the mill closure drew on the community's tradition of
"cultura cañera" (cane culture). The movement fortified community solidarity by calling on shared
cultural understandings of Puruarán's historical dependence on cane and sugar production. The
forging of the social movement reinforced notions of local community identity and bound people
together in common purpose. On December 7, 1992, community residents mobilized across

class and occupational lines and illegally seized the abandoned sugar refinery.

Under the

leadership of Gregorio Alvarez Vargas, cane growers, mill workers, and townspeople surrounded
the mill and removed six guards placed there by the owner.
After the seizure, 180 workers volunteered their labor to repair the factory and put it back in
operation. The illegal harvest, known locally as the "miniharvest," lasted from March through May,
1993.

Workers operated the sugar mill without the aid of engineers, chemists, and other

technicians. They processed 36,000 tons cane (almost one-fourth of the cane in the zone) into
3,300 tons of sugar, valued at $93,333 (U.S.) and made partial payments to some 500-700 cane
growers. Nonetheless, the mill owner prohibited them from selling the sugar that remained in the
warehouse.
A boiler mechanic explained his involvement in the illegal mill seizure. His discourse illustrates
how strong community ties, local work ethic, and ideas about social justice shaped local
understandings that led him to join the social movement:
I did not think just in myself. I was thinking about my community, that the government was
going to leave it a pure ghost town, without employment, without this source of work. Because if
you had seen how in the mill all the people were active, the extensive activity, and it made a lot
of money flow. Then it ended and look how we are. Never was it like this when we had the
mill. Our goal is to open the Puruarán mill. We are struggling only so we can work, that is all.
We are working people and we demonstrated that with the miniharvest that we made, without
even one engineer, with no one else but the workers. And we produced sugar and we are not
afraid to present it before any sugar mill that has all its engineers, all its technicians.
This action, however, brought Puruarán residents into direct conflict with the mill owner and the
government. Santos called on the state governor, who then ordered police to arrest the leaders of
the social movement.

Police removed seven people from their homes at gunpoint, and

incarcerated them. Released on bail after 20 days, they were put on parole for four years. One of
the parolees, suffering diabetes and heart disease, died before his release from parole

obligations. He had migrated with his family to Veracruz after the mill closed, but returned to
Puruarán to engage in the struggle to reopen the sugar mill. Another of the detainees related,
"We did not rob, we did not kill, we did not take anyone's property away from them. The crime
was to work. That was the crime. The crime was to work, that is why they jailed us."
The day of the arrests, July 3, 1993, armed police besieged the town. One hundred fifty to 200
police entered Puruarán at 5:00 a.m. and began to dismantle the sugar mill. As the church bells
tolled, townspeople united in a demonstration that prohibited the police from removing additional
mill equipment. Subsequently, sixty preventative police arrived to guard the mill, from 1993 to
1996. While under their "protection," police guards dismantled and destroyed machinery, cut
cables, broke windows, and fired numerous rifle shots through the roof. They intended to destroy
the mill to prevent the community from operating the factory.
The leader of the social movement, Gregorio Alvarez, escaped after absconding with much of
the profit from the illegal miniharvest. His deceit contributed to a series of divisions within the
social movement and left residents disillusioned and mistrustful.

As community tensions

increased, a struggle for control of the social movement began. Violence in the community
escalated. In 1995, the comisariado ejidal (president of the ejido) became the victim of murder.
The 1996 murder of Gregorio Alvarez followed. In this context of escalating violence, conflicts
over the sugar mill resulted in the murder of 15 individuals within a three-year period. The
community lost its former unity as new groups emerged to take control of the social movement to
reopen the sugar mill.
Puruarán's priest assumed leadership of the social movement in 1995, at the insistence of 500600 people attending a community meeting. The Committee for the Struggle to Reopen Ingenio
Puruarán (hence, "Committee") formed under his leadership. The Committee began a three-year
legal campaign to oblige the government to intervene on behalf of the community. Members of
the Committee presented petitions for expropriation of the mill to Michoacán's governor, state
officials, national officials, and President Ernesto Zedillo. The Committee based its demand for

expropriation on alleged violations of the sale contract, which obligates purchasers to maintain the
factories as sources of employment and to improve their productive capacities. Furthermore, it
requires them to "foment modernization, rehabilitation, diversification, integration, and agricultural
development." The Committee argued that the owner's noncompliance with the sale contract
justified expropriation.
In 1995 the Committee met with Santos de Hoyos and proposed three alternatives: 1) that he
sell or rent the mill to the community; 2) that he remain owner and let the community operate the
mill; or 3) that he reopen the mill and operate it himself.

Santos' response illustrates the

exclusionary character of the current development trend and its inability to address social
injustices: "The social aspect, the development [of the region], to remove so many people of the
region from poverty, this is not my responsibility. As a businessman, it has to be a business that
gives me earnings." Santos planned to salvage equipment from the Puruarán mill to use in his
Pedernales refinery. Ultimately, he demanded that the community vacate and return the mill to
him and threatened to close the nearby Pedernales mill, as well, if it were not returned. After
failing to achieve a favorable response, in 1996 townspeople again seized the Puruarán mill and
forced Santos' police guards to leave.
In the meantime, the Committee began to work with the Michoacán government to establish
small factories as alternative sources of employment. None materialized. Nonetheless, these
projects turned many people against the official Committee.

The movement fractured with

accusations that the priest's Committee "sold out" to the government and was no longer interested
in reopening the sugar mill. Charges flourished that its leaders became involved in the movement
only for political purposes. When the president of the Committee ran for Presidente Municipal on
the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) ticket in 1998, many claimed he supported the mill
opening in order to win votes.
A new faction emerged under the leadership of Pedro Tapia (pseudonym), a former mill
accountant. On December 11, 1998, Tapia formed the Sociedad Cooperativa Trabajadores del

Ingenio Puruarán (hence, "Sociedad Cooperativa"), comprised of loyal PRDistas (members of the
Partido Revolucionario Democrática). Some of them, as well, aspired to local offices in the 1998
elections. Political opening in Mexico and politization of the struggle along party lines further
disunited the social movement. Tapia's faction forced the Committee's guards out of the mill on
April 20, 1998, and initiated a second illegal operation of the mill, with poor results. Because of
mechanical failures, they processed only 20 tons of sugar from 5,000 tons of cane delivered by
loyal cañeros.
Curiously, the mill owner and state authorities did not intervene in the 1998 operation.
Indirectly, however, the manager of the Pedernales mill denied further credit to cañeros who
delivered cane to Puruarán. The government, in turn, dismissed workers involved in repair and
operation of the mill from employment in the construction of irrigation canals. The irrigation project
offered the most important, if temporary, source of employment since the mill closure.
Cañeros who delivered cane to Santos' Pedernales mill in 1998 suffered different
consequences. In August, with 60 percent of its sugar still in the warehouse, competition with
HFCS left Ingenio Pedernales without the cash flow to make payments to cane growers. Lists
posted on the door of the casa ejidal (ejido building) advised cañeros when they would receive
payment for their cane. People lined up daily to check the lists and desperation mounted, since
over two and one-half months had passed since the end of the harvest.
Tapia's faction quickly lost most of its support after the leader sold the sugar and syrup stored
since the 1993 miniharvest, then claimed that he had no money to pay cañeros or mill workers.
This created greater discontent among those who labored for months growing cane, repairing the
mill, and processing the cane without pay. Accusations spread through the community that Tapia
pocketed money from the sale of sugar, that the priest's group confiscated cash donations made
to the social movement, and that the Committee had been bought off by the government. Even
so, the desire to reopen the mill rivaled the force of increasing factionalism. One resident's
commentary illustrated this greater common aim:

Well, there were certain things about the priest's committee that we did not like, but we are
in the same boat. Thus, if they get it opened, well fine. And if Tapia achieves it, good, or
another group, good. Here, if the virgin opens it, if the Señor San José [the village patron
saint] opens it, but [what matters is] that it gets opened.
Political will to reopen the mill transcended the sharp divisions in 1998 as events unfolded
that promised to reenergize the local economy. In August, Tapia's faction visited officials of
Pascual, a manufacturer of the natural fruit drinks marketed under the "Boing" label. Pascual
works with cooperatives, finances their operations, and purchases their sugar for its products.
On January 28, 1999, the Puruarán mill once again opened its doors under contract with
Pascual.

During the 1999 harvest, between 200 and 300 cane growers, including those

associated with the official Committee, delivered their cane to Puruarán. Mill workers, who
processed 3,000 tons of sugar, again received their bi-monthly paychecks. By 2000, from
60,470 tons of cane, the Puruarán mill produced 5,134 tons of sugar, valued at $2,247,000
(U.S.). Production directly benefited 1250 cañeros and 237 mill workers. This solution provides
people with work and income and guarantees a market for their sugar. People in this community,
acutely aware of global trends that threaten their livelihoods, sought an alternative solution. As
one mill worker asserted, "Pascual does not use one drop of fructose."
CONCLUSIONS
In the Mexican sugar sector, privatization initially showed poor performance as a result of deficient
investments, excessive sugar imports, and rising debts among cañeros. A strategy of triage--the
exclusion of inefficient cane growers and unproductive sugar mills accompanied economic
recovery of the industry in the mid 1990s.

Gains made in the sector were not equitably

distributed. While some cañeros benefited, others found themselves marginalized.
Recovery of Mexico's sugar export capacity coincided with implementation of NAFTA. Even
though neoliberalism promotes laissez-faire principles, political pressure to protect the U.S.
sugar market circumvented dictums for "free trade." Whereas quotas limited Mexico's access to

the U.S. market, HFCS presented fierce competition in its domestic market. The import of
HFCS from the U.S. threatened to close 20 of Mexico's remaining 60 sugar mills. From the
perspective of the government, over-production on the world market and displacement of cane
sugar with alternative sweeteners makes consolidation of into fewer mills a logical choice. The
recent expropriation of mills, while contradictory to neoliberalism, may represent an initial move
in this direction.

A number of expropriated mills will likely meet the same fate as Ingenio

Puruarán.
In the context of global transformation, this chapter examined one community's response to
the closure of its sugar mill. This closure may be viewed as an outcome of the macro-level
forces cited above. Residents of Puruarán, Michoacán united to reject the neoliberal model that
threatened community integrity and their means of family survival.
representative of other communities that struggle with neoliberalism.

Puruarán may not be
Yet this community

demonstrates how, through local resistance, its residents managed to restore social justice.
A large volume of theoretical literature addresses macro-level perspectives of neoliberalism
(Gustafson 1994). Transformations taking place in rural communities may be less visible, but
equally dramatic. This chapter takes into account "the impact of neoliberal policies on the
people we do not usually hear from" (Phillips 1998:xi) without neglecting the dynamic interaction
of global and local perspectives and processes.

It accounts for global transformations in

neoliberal ideology and practice, yet gives voice to those who mobilized to confront its
consequences.
Literature on alternatives to the neoliberal model suggests much room for theoretical debate
on the ability of neoliberalism to hold sway against local will. Yet, despite the probability that
Latin American governments will continue to extend neoliberal policies, there is evidence for
growing popular resistance among those subjected to marginalization (Petras 1999; Phillips
1998; Stephen 1997). As Fox (1994) clarifies, when the state withdraws social guarantees,
militant opposition increases, along with the capacity of campesino movements to seek

alternative means of survival.

The social movement that emerged in Puruarán exemplifies

growing discontent and willingness to find alternative solutions. The cooperative continues to
operate the mill, but is plagued by ongoing internal struggles and bossism, and production costs
that exceed income.
Resistance to neoliberalism expresses itself in diverse ways, from accommodation, to more
high-risk, independent collective action (Chollett 1997; Petras 1999; Phillips 1998). The factors
that condition alternative strategies remain obscure, but preliminary analysis of Puruarán's
social movement suggests several factors that led to political mobilization: historically deep
cultural traditions, abrupt closure of the community's main source of employment, lack of
economic alternatives, inability of most residents to sustain their families, and a capacity to
forge unified action based on identification with the community.
Several research questions remain for future analysis.

Will campesinos benefit from

neoliberalism in the long-term? Will they compensate for the retrenchment of market-driven
forces by abandoning small-scale production for wage labor?

Can emigration resolve

unemployment caused by corporate consolidation? As traditional crops lose their competitive
value, will more lucrative illegal crops become the strategy of preference? Or, alternatively, will
future macro-level economic policies be flexible enough to incorporate concern with cultural
integrity, community social institutions, economic self-sufficiency, and demands for autonomous
political action that emanate from local communities?
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ENDNOTES

i

For example, Empresas Gamesa, whose owner purchased the Puruarán mill, is a consortium

comprised of numerous enterprises:

Promotora Agropecuaria Gamesa, Productos Gerber,

Ingenios Gamesa, and Grupo Gamesa. Grupo Gamesa includes Nabisco Famosa, Harinera
Santos, Dulces Lady Baltimore, Mareas Alimenticias Internacionales, Galletera Palma, Gamesa
Comercial, Desarrollo Industrial Gamesa, Almacenadora Gamesa, Desarrollo Inmobiliario
Gamesa, Pastas Tepeyac, Inmobiliario Jalisciense, Corporativo Gamesa, and Acrosantos (Ortega
1990).
ii

Mexico imported sugar from: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil,
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Korea, Philippines (Diario de Colima 1991;
Zúñiga 1992).

iii

These increases included: hectares of cane, 14 percent; tons of cane, 21 percent; field yield

(tons of cane per hectare), 6 percent; tons of sugar, 43% percent; kg. of sugar per hectare, 25%
percent; sucrose content of cane, 16% percent; and factory yield, 18 percent (source: CNIAA).

